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NOTE:. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES CURRENTLY OCCURRING IN
THE BALTIC STATES AGAINST THE ETHNIC
RUSSIAN NATIONAL MINORITY
Marc Holzapfel
"No idea is worth a child's tears."'
Roughly 3,000 nations existing in the world today2 are
constrained to live in only 184 countries.3 Such a huge disparity
condemns each of these distinct groups to compete for equal status
within the confines of a single boundary. This plight may seem trivial
when seen through the lenses of many relatively homogenous
*
Attorney for VEBA Corporation in New York, N.Y. J.D., cum laude, Vermont
Law School, 1995; B.A., Bucknell University, 1992. Special thanks to Professor
Richard Peterec, Nicole Holzapfel and Debbie Mans for their advice and counsel.
Alexander Rutskoi, the former Vice-President of Russia, quotes Dostoevsky "to
condemn... the 'nationalistic chauvinistic' policies pursued by newly independent
republics -- such as laws depriving Russians of the vote or requiring that they learn
the local language to hold governmental office." Leyla Boulton, Boris Yeltsin's
Troublesome Deputy Waits Serenely For Call To Power: Alexander Rutskoi
Explains His Broadsides Against Radical Reforms To Leyla Boulton, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Boulton].
2 Some estimates are as high as 5000. Telephone Interview with Richard J.
Peterec, Professor, Bucknell University (Jan. 23 1994). See infra, notes 9, 10 and
11 and accompanying text for the definitions of a nation and state.
' 184 is the number of current member countries in the United Nations. BARRY
CARTER AND PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS AND
NEW DEVELOPMENTS 828 (1994). This number of United Nations' members,
however, is not entirely indicative of the number of recognized states in the world
today. For uniformity sake, the perspective from the United States Department of
State will be used throughout this article to determine whether or not a country is
actually a state. From this viewpoint, there are 191 states in existence.
BARTHOLOMEW, MINI WORLD FACTFILE 7-11 (1993).
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countries, notably the United States.' The United States' disinterest
and inexperience with prevalent international national minority
issues, like the Baltics and former Yugoslav Republics, has prompted
many Americans to ask the.inevitable: is there a need for all these
different cultures; and should we help preserve the world's national
minorities?
The answer to these questions is a resounding "yes." 5 Even
though the loss of one national minority does not seem to adversely
affect the progression of global events, each extinction threatens
human advancement. Smaller nations may not substantially impact
the rest of the world, however, they certainly do contribute to the
diversity and growth of all people. Mental and physical human
4 The United States' concerns typically focus on race and gender problems. These
issues, although divisive and potentially dangerous, are not of the same genus as
national minority issues. But see Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. DOC.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/3841Rev.1, at 113 (1979) [hereinafter Capotorti].
' The answers to the questions are specifically directed towards preserving the
culture and traditions of the national minority, and are not calls for self-
determination. An international system of national minority protection does not
support each minority's call for national self-determination. Indeed,
[t]here is no concept such as the right of nations to self-
determination . . . that there is the right of peoples to self-
determination, whereas the concept of 'people' is not tantamount
to that of ethnic group. Had it been otherwise, there would have
been no India, Indonesia, and a score of other states, including
Russia. They would have been eroded by ethnic separatism.
Moscow NEws, Sept. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Current Digest
of the Soviet Press file. The dangers in advocating self-determination for each
nation are expressed well by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Bhoutros
Bhoutros-Ghali, in his "Agenda for Peace:"
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty ... [sic] has
passed; its theory was never matched by reality .... [sic] Yet if
every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood,
there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and
economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to
achieve.
U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/85 (1993).
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expression flourish with diversity. People from every nation in the
world continue to enter the United States, bringing with them unique
backgrounds and experiences which benefit American society.
Tolerating the abrogation of one nation's rights jeopardizes
the rights of all others. Ethnic conflicts and nationalism have always
been the bane of the world's existence. The deficiency of minority
protections has directly contributed to wars, genocide, pogroms, and
slaughters. This alarming notion is the underlying premise of this
article.
Intertwined with the above principle are four separate, yet
ultimately related, sections of the article. The first section will
address the inherent principles of national minorities, who they are,
and their salient definitions. The next section, will discuss the types
of protections available to minorities, and focusing particularly on
United Nations' documents for national minority protection. The
third section will scrutinize human rights violations against the ethnic
Russians living in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. Finally, the fourth section will analyze potential
implications of human rights abuses in this region, concluding with
a discussion of the urgency of this problem and a possible solution.
I. WHAT IS A NATIONAL MINoRrrY?
The norms of international law lack a precise definition of
"national minority."6 Consequently, no concrete legal basis exists for
describing a national minority.7 A minority typically consists of a
population group that comprises a numerically inferior position in a
Capotorti, supra note 4, at 5.
Tore Modeen, The International Protection of National Minorities in Europe, 37
Acta Academiae Aboensis Humanistiska Vetenskaper 1, at 15 (1969) [hereinafter
Modeen].
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country that is distinguished in some way from the majority.
Distinguishing characteristics can be linked through external or
objective qualities, typically linguistic or cultural. Subjective criteria,
such as national sentiment and personal feeling, will also serve to
define such a minority group.'
A population group possessing these common characteristics
is called a "nation," regardless of whether it has established its own
state.9 Rarely comprised of only one, typically two, three, or more
nations can live within the boundaries of a state.'" The ability of a
population group to have a minority claim does not rest solely upon
numerical quantity. "Where a numerical minority possesses the
controlling power of a state, whether under the national constitution
or de facto rights, it cannot either be characterized as a national
minority."" Thus, the term "minority" is rarely used when referring
to a numerically inferior population group that has been recognized
by law or custom as equal to the majority group. This numerically
inferior group is neither a national minority under a geopolitical
definition, nor a national majority; each nation is simply a different
national group. 2
National minorities always hold "a hint of fear -- fear of
becoming subject to discrimination on the grounds of its minority
status, or fear that the minority may be suppressed either through
direct pressure from the majority, or through inadequate opportunities
for cultural development."'13 In this vein, regardless of a national
minority's numerical quantity, the fear of discrimination coupled with
uncertainty regarding preservation of its unique characteristics
8 Id.
9 Id. at 15-16.
'o The most common prerequisites used for determining statehood are: defined
territory, population, an organized government, the ability to enter into foreign
relations, and a degree of permanency. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987).
u Modeen, supra note 7, at 21.
12 Id. See also Capotorti, supra note 4, at 87.
13 Modeen, supra note 7, at 22.
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indicate a need for minority protection.
1 4
Another common characteristic of a national minority is the
formation of a group which recognizes its inability to achieve
majority status or retain equal influence in the government, yet still
wishes to preserve its unique culture and language. 5 The desire
toward self preservation is necessary and essential and binds the
minority group together to form a nation. "Only when a population
lovingly and proudly appreciates its language and culture" can there
be grounds for a national existence."' 6 If a population lacks national
consciousness, even though linguistic and cultural distinctiveness
exist, a nation is not established. 7
" Id. at 23-24. The notion of fear has relevance with respect to which approach,
subjective or objective, a nation uses to justify its minority status. For a detailed
explanation of the subjective and objective approaches. See infra Part I-B-(1),(2).
"5 The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Greco-Bulgarian
Communities Case:
By tradition... the 'community' is a group of persons
living in a given country or locality, having a race,
religion, language and traditions of their own and united
by this identity of race, religion, language and traditions
in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving
their traditions and upbringing of their children in
accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race
and rendering mutual assistance to each other.
1930 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B.) No. 17, at 21.
"( Modeen, supra note 7, at 20.
17 Because of the frequent inadequacy of achieving the requisite level of
cohesiveness, foreign nationals, migrant workers, or colonists fail to fall into the
definition of a national minority or nation. Most Latin American countries maintain
"that immigrants and their descendants do not constitute minorities." Capotorti,
supra note 4, at 13. See also YORAM DINSTEIN AND MALA TABORY, THE
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1992) [hereinafter DINSTEIN
& TABORY].
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A. The Most Important Criterion: Language
A common language binds the minority together. To the great
extent language transmits culture and acts to preserve and further the
national minority's identity and heritage. A minority encounters
difficulties in preserving its separate culture when lacking a national
consciousness. For example, the Salasacans and other Indigenous
peoples of Ecuador realized that in order to make a valid demand for
Ecuador to become a bilingual state, their oral language had to be
written and given structure. Thus, in the late 1970's, a rush began to
codify the Quechian language. 8
When different groups speak clearly distinct languages, it is
easier to establish the linguistic, as well as the historical and cultural
differences. 9 A distinct language grants a national minority a single
culture and the language-based complements of literature, theater,
poetry, and other linguistic idiosyncrasies. 0
All three Baltic languages are quite distinct from Russian and
throughout their "annexation," one of the main priorities of the
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians was to preserve their native
language from the overwhelming and incessant Russification attempts
of Soviets.2 ' A distinctive language is an essential requirement in
order for a population group to be a nation.22
B. Is It a National Minority?
" Interview with Tarjelia Trigo, Member of the Otovalean Women's
Cooperative, in Ambato, Ecuador (Nov. 14, 1990).
19 Modeen, supra note 7, at 19.
20 This indispensable prerequisite of linguistic identity, ignores racial and
religious differences since these specific differences have largely lost their
significance with "modem European relations between states and individuals." Id.
at 19-20.
21 FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, SOVIET UNION A COUNTRY STUDY 146-151,
197 (Louis R. Mortimer ed.) (1991).
22 Capotorti, supra note 4, at 43.
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1. The subiective aproach. Classification under the
subjective approach categorizes a minority based on subjective signs
of nationality. Principal weight is placed on psychological criteria --
whether an individual wishes to belong to the minority or majority.
Nationality is ultimately defined by an ideal or spiritual element.23
The national conscience, drawing power from a sense of community,
mutual will, and nationalism, plays a far greater role in delineating
minority groups than national origin and culture.
With this approach the individual's subjective position is
decisive.24  However, difficulties arise when evaluating an
individual's internal beliefs. Because personal beliefs and proclivities
are prone to frequent change, lasting and concrete classifications
consequently, are difficult. Since laws can protect only a minorities'
externally expressed characteristics and not subjective notions of
nationality, which cannot be objectively distinguished, subjective
criteria of national identity are insupportable under a legal
classification of a national minority.' Thus, legal classification of
national minorities is best accomplished using an objective approach.
2. The objective approach. The objective approach relies
upon linguistic and cultural qualities of a given population group.
Nationality is determined by criteria such as language, territory,
culture, origin, family, residence, upbringing, and education. These
common interests, histories, and community problems are strong
23 DINSTEIN & TABORY, supra note 17, at 28.
24 This is an important point because groups in different states who speak the
same language frequently develop different cultures even though they have retained
the same language. A population group may split among different states, but still
maintain the same language and culture. The minority's desire to belong to this
distinct nation separates him and his nation from another group of people that
merely speaks the same language. Modeen, supra note 7, at 17.
25 DINSTEIN & TABORY, supra note 17, at 29.
336 BUFFALO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2
cohesive forces.26 Scrutiny of these external characteristics
determines nationality.
Using an exclusively objective or exclusively subjective
classification may lead to incorrect categorizations. For example, a
person might be born in one country, but this objective fact ignores
the person's inner wishes and subjective feelings of national loyalty.
Using the combination of both the subjective and objective
approaches to classification, accurate categorization of national
minorities may be achieved.27
It is generally accepted that the concept [of a national
minority] has both objective and subjective elements;
that is, the members of a "minority" will usually
possess not only a distinctive language, racial
characteristics, religion, culture or tradition, but they
will also have a conviction of shared national identity,
consciousness and solidarity, which they believe
differentiates them from the majority in the state, and
which they desire to perpetuate. 8
C. Historical Persecution of Minorities
Extreme nationalism is one of the greatest threats to national
minorities today.29 Although never explicitly stated as "nationalism,"
states use the euphemisms of "internationalism," "socialism," or
"anti-colonialism" to disguise imperialistic forms of nationalism with
actual pernicious intent. Masked under these various guises, states
attempt either to destroy or assimilate their national minorities.
26 Modeen, supra note 7, at 17.
27 DINsTEIN & TABORY, supra note 17, at 29.
28 Id. at 60.
21 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/85 (1993).
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Genocide, segregation, expulsion, displacement" and
denationalization are all techniques used by the majority against
national minorities.3'
Minority assimilation goes beyond the more subtle path of
infringing rights through discriminatory legislation.32 Discriminatory
legislation, as a tool, effectively dissolves minority unity by abridging
all guarantees of preserving national characteristics. This method
prevents the minority from asserting linguistic, voting, cultural,
religious and educational rights -- basically barring all forms of
minority expression. Inhibiting the use of the minority's language
jeopardizes the minority's traditions, threatens culture, and
substantially limits participation in activities with, and of, the
majority. The power and potential of these persecutions ultimately
gives rise to calls for an international system of minority protection.
II. PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS
The United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Subcommission on Protection of Minorities
distinguished between minorities whose members desire equality and
30 This is the transfer of large numbers of people to different areas of the country
to dilute a particular minority either to make that minority more governable, to
exploit the natural resources belonging to it, or to thwart claims to self-
determination. Id.
" Modeen, supra note 7, at 38. Denationalization declares the minority's rights
of citizenship to be invalid in order to compel them to emigrate.
32 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
.. Modeen, supra note 7, at 41-42. Even if the minority possesses a knowledge
of the majority language, the minority is still handicapped, in relation to the
majority, if it is forced to abandon its own tongue and preserve that of the majority.
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those who desire to maintain the status quo.34 Two types of demands
are noted either positive or negative minority protection.
The Subcommission describes positive minority protection as
"the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in
general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure
of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics
which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of
the population." This type of protection is of an affirmative action
genus, protecting the minority with special privileges for the express
purpose of preserving its language and culture. Such protection does
seem to be reverse discrimination, but, in reality, is a protective
measure to enhance equality for all. " Believing that negative
minority protection is a mere token gesture without any substantial or
meaningful significance, a minority seeking positive protection
demands special additional rights to guarantee the preservation of its
own national identity.36 Positive protection does not violate the equal
rights of the majority because the special treatment is afforded only
as a precaution against assimilation.
Negative minority protection, on the other hand, is designed
to prevent the majority from actively discriminating against the
minority. Under this system, the minority seeks to obtain the same
rights as the majority and mere equality before the law is, by itself,
sufficient protection.37 Such protection, however, does not guarantee
full minority expression. Because one nationality may find itself
constituting part of a state containing other minorities, a multi-
national state, "a natural assimilation can still take place [even] when
direct development is not pursued or even desired by the majority.
38
Because minority protection may be vital legislation for the survival
34 E/CN.4/Sub.2/119 & 32 (1949); E/CN.4/Sub.2/140, Annex.1 (1950); and
E/cn.4/Sub.2/149 & 26 (1951).
31 Modeen, supra note 7, at 43.
36 Id.
31 Id. This type of protection is often more palatable because it is not of the
apparent affirmative action nature typically attributed to positive protection.
38 Id. at 37
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of even the most stable and cohesive minorities, positive protection
can secure minority rights and ensure the preservation of that nation.
A. Early Trends
A number of states undertook unilateral obligations for
minority protection upon entering the League of Nations in 1918.' 9
These declarations assumed the same authority as bilateral treaties
and were aimed, as stated by the Permanent Court of International
Justice, to "eliminate a dangerous source of oppression, recrimination
and dispute, [and] to prevent racial and religious hatreds from having
free play." 40  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all issued such
declarations, on September 17, 1923, July 7, 1923, and May 12, 1922
respectively. These declarations effectively granted protection under
international law to the existing minorities. The underlying principle
of minority treaties is to secure for minorities the possibility of living
peacefully alongside the majority, while simultaneously preserving
their own distinguishing characteristics.
41
The initial concern for human rights in international law
stemmed from the doctrine of natural rights.42 Both the notion of
natural rights and the general principles of international law
developed with the belief that state sovereignty should be limited.
For international human rights treaties to be effective, responsibility
must be balanced with state sovereignty.43 The primary purpose for
19 ELLEN LUTZ, HURST HANNUM, AND KATHRYN BURKE, NEW DIRECTIONS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (1989) [hereinafter LUTZ].
4" Advisory Opinion No. 6, Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by
Germany to Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 25.
" Advisory Opinion No. 64, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 64, at 17.
42 LUTZ, supra note 39, at 4-5.
43 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 46, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1993135 (1993).
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observing minority rights in international law is to protect
fundamental human rights, such as the right to preserve one's own
language right or the right to maintain one's own culture."
Because minority conflicts are often kindling for wider scale
conflagrations, modem international law looks to establish norms that
will not only alleviate conflicting pressures, but also make possible
the peaceful resolution of conflicts between states. Experience has
shown that a denial of human rights and the abridgment of individual
freedoms trigger expanding conflicts. The once internal strife
frequently burgeons into a regional war and bilateral and multilateral
tensions.45 In becoming a matter for international concern, the
minority problem has become an increasingly difficult matter in
international law.46
B. Customary International Law
According to customary international law47 a state is not
considered internationally responsible for the preservation of national
minorities or for just treatment of its own citizens.48 Take for
example, Article 2 7 of the UN Charter, which states: "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter should authorize the UN to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or should require the members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter." This law has been interpreted
as granting a state the right to decide whether a minority in its
4 Not surprisingly, this language is found in Article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
41 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 7-9, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
46 Bartram S. Brown, International Law: The Protection of Human Rights in
Disintegrating States: A New Challenge, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 203, 203 (1992)
[hereinafter Brown].
47 In contrast to the West, Soviet Courts have never applied custom as a source of
law. Lori Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American
Courts, 100 YALE L.J. 2315, 2321 (1991).
48 MENNO T. KAMMINGO, INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1992).
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territory shall enjoy any protection for their language, cultural, and
human rights, unless a state agrees to submit its citizens' rights to
international control.49  Due to actual, and perceived, legal
infringements on state sovereignty, states typically shy away from
international obligations.5 0
C. Treaty Law
In an attempt to safeguard fundamental human rights, a
universal system of treaties developed under international law. 1
Protection of minorities' rights, however, has been difficult with this
approach. For example, minority protection is not referred to in the
UN Charter, which contains no specific article providing for forcible
action against member states responsible for crimes against national
minorities. Article 2, 7 of the Charter provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in the
matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII [Actions With Respect to Threats to the Peace,
'9 Brown, see supra note 46, at 203. One narrow exception to this custom,
however, does exist. A state can interfere in another state's internal situation only
to protect a threatened minority in that state--the so called "intervention
d'humanite." FEDERAL RESEARCH DIvIsION, TURKEY A COUNTRY STUDY 32 (Carol
Migdalovitz ed.,1988). See also Modeen, supra note 7, at 33.
" Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 623 (1992).
S1 1950 I.C.J. 70-7 1.
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Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression] .
52
Thus one state cannot interfere in the domestic jurisdiction of other
states with regard to national minority concerns. The last clause of [
7 makes an exception with respect to Chapter VII and the Security
Council. But under this provision, the Security Council can only
intervene if war threatens."-
The Security Council's ability to undertake an "intervention
d'humanite" is dependent on the existence of an actual threat of war
arising from the suppression of human rights." "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."55 Under Article 42 of the UN
Charter, a threat of civil war may lead to UN measures that infringe
on the sovereignty of a state. 6
The drafters of the UN Charter originally planned to include
specific references to human rights. 7 Such provisions have required
precise detail to be effective, and thus could not be suitably included
in the UN Charter. 8 In lieu of specific references to human rights in
the UN Charter, the drafters agreed that provisions for human rights
would be formulated in one or more separate covenants.
The UN eventually created three "treaties" documents
52 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 39 and 42.
4 See supra note 49 for further discussion on "intervention d'humanitc."
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
5 Article 2 and 7 directs that the United Nations may only "interfere" within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state in agreement with Chapter VII actions to counter
"Acts of Aggression."
57 R. BUILDER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7, FROM GUIDE TO HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICE 3-17 (H. Hannum ed, 1983) [hereinafter BUILDERI.
58 Modeen, supra note 7, at 103.
"' BUILDER, supra note 57, at 3-17.
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commonly referred to as the International Bill on Human Rights: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant on
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights. The goal of these treaties is
to "protect non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for
equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of
differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which
they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of the
population., 60 These treaties do not permit the arbitrary withdrawal
of citizenship or the limitation of the right to obtain citizenship on
ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other grounds.61
Most salient to our discussion is Article 27 of the Covenant
on Political and Civil Rights which states: "[i]n those states in which
ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." 62 This
article appreciates the possibility that positive or special measures
may be needed in order to enable persons belonging to ethnic
minorities to exercise the rights granted to them.63
The route normally taken with human rights violations is for
a member state to follow the reporting requirements of Article 17 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights' 4 and submit a list of the alleged human rights abuses to the
Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc), one of the six organs of the
o U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/5210. (1992).
61 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 18-19, U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.2/1992/SR.19
(1992).
62 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/NGO/21 (1993).
63 Asbjorn Eide, Minority Situations: In Search of Peacefid and Constructive
Solutions, 66 NOTRE DAMEL. REv. 1311, 1335 (1991) [hereinafter Eide].
" U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
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United Nations, for investigation. If the human rights allegations
have credence, EcoSoc establishes a special commission, the
Commission on Human Rights, to investigate.' The Commission,
itself unable to take action, submits non-binding recommendations to
EcoSoc for consideration.66 Then EcoSoc makes recommendations
to the General Assembly, the organ which attempts to promote
respect for human rights on that particular issue. Russia or Latvia, for
example, circulated a notice of alleged violations. Pursuant to the
above described procedures, the General Assembly received a copy
of EcoSoc's recommendations and then published its own report.
IH. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
A. Historical Background
The Baltic states existed for centuries until a "foreign
occupation had temporarily upset their ethnic structure. ' ' 7 This
phrase exudes hostility towards the Soviet Union, a country the three
Baltic states effectively "joined" in 1945 after it was annexed during
World War II. The incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
was based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1941, and because of
it, the Baltics became three of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics.6
s
The Soviet Union contended that this incorporation was a
"formal act of accession to the Soviet Union by the Baltics [and]
65 Id. art. 19.
66 Id. art. 21. The Economic and Social Council's resolution states: "It]he
Commission has no power to take any action in regard to any complaints regarding
human rights." U.N. PUBLICATION E/CN.4/14/REV.2.
67 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/19921SR.33 (1992).
6 See Eide, supra note 63, at 1323. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was declared
void by the Supreme Soviet in 1991. The United States never officially recognized
the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, and only acknowledged the
Soviet Union as consisting of twelve republics, not the standard fifteen.
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constituted a valid basis for their continued membership in the Soviet
Union., 69 Today, Russia asserts:
[Y]ou can't call the Russian troops there now as [sic]
"occupying troops." The fact that the Baltic states had
been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union did
not imply a subsequent occupation in any legal sense,
any more than Texas or New Mexico could be
regarded as territories "occupied" by the United
States.7°
Irrespective of the validity of the incorporation, after the
annexation, millions of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were
deported to Siberia and other eastern oblasts.7' One example of these
deportations is seen in Riga, where only one third of its population
was the native Latvian. The majority was Russian. 72 To fill the
human gap left by these deportations, the Soviets established
settlements of their own nationals, most of them Russian, and
imposed their own language, culture, and ideals upon the remaining
people in the Baltics.73 Instead, new minorities were to be found in
the Soviet Union itself, and because of the total incorporation of the
Baltics, the new minorities were chiefly Baltic. National languages
of the Baltics were in danger of becoming defunct as a consequence
of this Russification policy.74
After coming to power in 1985, General-Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev stated that he would no longer enforce the Brezhnev
6"9 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/93 (1993).
70 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
71 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.12 (1992).
72 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
73 Id.
' Modcen, supra note 7, at 68.
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Doctrine. The Doctrine stated that Warsaw Pact troops were justified
to interfere with the internal affairs of another country whenever the
goals of socialism were being threatened.75 Upon opening a once
barred road to reform, previously constrained feelings of nationalism
were unleashed and ignited pro-independence movements in all three
Baltics. Almost forty-five years after their forceful incorporation, the
Baltics declared sovereignty in 1988.76 Because the majority of states
never recognized the annexation of the Baltics, the calls by the West
for the Baltics' independence were not seen, at least from its view as
calls for secession, but rather as drives for re-independence.
The haste with which the West granted diplomatic recognition
to the Baltics attested to the West's support of the Baltics' Herculean
struggle for self-determination. President Bush, for example, granted
diplomatic recognition to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on
September 2, 1991. The West hoped to weaken the Soviet Union and
end the Cold War. While this objective was successful, the breakup
of the Soviet Union aggravated minority tensions and "created the
new crises, not of two rival super-Powers, but of fragmented
nationalities in various republics, some of which contained nuclear
weapons." " The three new Baltic states were admitted into the
United Nations on September 17, 1991.78
Russia was one of the first states to recognize the
"restoration" of the Baltics' independence. 79 As president of the
Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, Yeltsin offered the Baltics much
75 This doctrine, having as much binding power as the Monroe Doctrine, the
Carter Doctrine, or the Reagan Doctrine -- namely none -- was declared in 1968 as
ajustification for sending primarily Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia to quell an
uprising. L. HENKIN, USE OF FORCE: LAW AND U.S. POLICY, RIGHT VS. MIGHT 37-
69 (1989).
76 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 51, U.N. Doe A/47/PV. 17 (1992).
77 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993).
78 Jack Matlock, Recent Changes in the "Soviet Union," J. MARSHALL L. REV.
295, 301 (1992).
79 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 51, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.17 (1992). A treaty
between Estonia and Russia in which both countries recognized the other as
independent sovereign states was signed on 12 January 1991.
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needed support at vital moments of their long struggle for
independence, and urged Gorbachev to withdraw the Soviet military
presence therefrom.8"
B. Treaty Background
Human rights abuses in the Baltics are being scrutinized
through the provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights. The
states involved in this dispute are themselves parties to these human
rights documents: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
in 1992. Other agreements, such as the agreement establishing the
Commonwealth of Independent States explicitly guarantees the
protection of minority rights.82 The Russian Federation and the Baltic
states, working with the Council on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), adopted the Helsinki Document in 1992, a treaty
calling for the resolution of regional problems "in a peaceful manner
"' Nicolas Doughty, NATO Urges Russia to Resume Baltic Pullout, Reuters, Oct.
30, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Doughty].
91 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 7-8, U.N. Doc. ECN/CN.4/1993/69 (1992).
Russia became a member in 1976.
82 The relevant provision reads as follows:
The High Contracting Parties guarantee to their citizens,
regardless of their nationality or other differences, equal rights
and freedoms. Each of the High contracting Parties guarantees
to the citizens of the other Parties, and also to stateless persons
resident in their territory, regardless of national affiliation or
other differences, civil, political, social, economic, and cultural
rights and freedoms in accordance with the universally
recognized international norms relating to human rights.
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/46/771 (1991).
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and through negotiations. ' 3
C. Human Rights Abuses
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited
arguably the most complex national minority situation in the world. 4
Its plight was exacerbated by the nearly 100 nations --more than 27
million people or "40% of the former Soviet Union's minorities --
living within its borders, each with its own specific characteristics,
traditions, and customs. '8 5 The nationalistic penchants of these
myriad nations have engendered ethnic divisions and rivalries long
suppressed by the Soviet Union. As Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman
of the Council of State of the Republic of Georgia stated, "[T]ime
bombs were planted for our futures. While the power of ideology and
repressive compulsion kept this heterogeneous community together,
the bombs lay idle. As soon as that power was removed, they went
off, and today a blast of enormous power [namely nationalism] is
destroying whole States."8 6 The millions whose citizenship used to
be Soviet now owe their allegiance to their respective republics. The
two and one-half million Russians 7 in the Baltic states are being
treated as foreigners although they have lived there for generations.8
The inherently poor nature of Russia's relations with other republics
only compounds this difficulty.
Today, there are sixty-five million former Soviet citizens
living outside their republic of origin. As many as one million people
" General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics, UNITED
PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 26, 1992.
4 'The situation in Russia [with respect to national minorities] was more complex
than anywhere else in the world, including the former Yugoslavia, because of the
nature of relations with the former republics." U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 44, U.N.
Doe. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993) (emphasis added).
' Bohdan Pyskir, Russia Has No Minority Rights Claim, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, April 14,1993, at 19 [hereinafter Pyskir].
86 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 31, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.12 (1992).
17 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
88 Id. U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993).
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have been forced to migrate to and from outlying republics, primarily
because of escalating ethnic conflicts. The Agency for International
Development estimated that Russia alone received 200,000 refugees
and as many as 400,000 migrants left the central Asian republics and
the Baltic states as of 1992.89 Due to the large number of national
minorities, questions relating to the protection of minorities had
become an integral part of the ongoing negotiations with States of the
former Republics of the Soviet Union.
The largest group living in diaspora is the twenty-five million
ethnic Russians, accounting for seventeen percent of the total ethnic
Russian population.90 These people became aliens overnight. As
noted by UN Secretary-General Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali, the
indigenous peoples in the new republics feel that the Russians
occupied superior positions and "discriminated against their
languages and culture in the past. Reverse discrimination appears to
be their reaction under the new order of things."91  Reverse
discrimination is part and parcel of the Baltics' own resurgence of
national pride and culture because "the quest for independence
involves a reasserti[on] of national control over language and
culture.""2 By disparaging the language and culture of their former
oppressors, the Baltics psychologically amplify the power of their
nations' and states' revival.
The breakup of the Soviet Union has led to problems not just
with minority rights, but also with military succession as well. The
Soviet Union's non-volunteer military was comprised of 2,000,000
soldiers stationed throughout the fifteen republics and about 130,000
89 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 44, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993).
" Pyskir, supra note 85, at 19. See also U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 44, U.N.
Doe. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993).
91 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 44, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1993/35 (1993) (emphasis
added).
92 Eide, supra note 63, at 1323.
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troops had been based in the Baltics. Since the Baltics gained
independence in 1991, forty percent of the troops were withdrawn.93
Russian troops94 are still stationed on the territory of Latvia and
Estonia and the "host" governments have been denied the right to
monitor these forces. 95 Lithuania, on the other hand, refused to enact
anti-Russian legislation and the absence of this discrimination
allowed President Yeltsin to remove his forces without offending the
Russian hard right. Russia negotiated treaties with the three republics
on troop withdrawal and agreed to have all of its forces removed by
August 31, 1993.96 Russia also signed the Helsinki Political
Declaration on June 10, 1992, agreeing to the "unconditional
evacuation of its troops from the Baltic States in 1993."' Noticeably
absent from this list of the Baltics is Lithuania. Russia removed its
troops because Lithuania did not enact discriminatory laws against the
ethnic Russians. This fact enabled President Yeltsin, besieged by
nationalist opponents, to withdraw his troops without fueling their
rages, buttressing their support, or validating their nationalistic
cause.
98
In October 1992, Russia said the troop withdrawal might be
suspended because of a housing shortage back in Russia for the
returning troops.99 The majority of the national minority violations
have occurred in Estonia and Latvia. When the Baltics protested,
Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin agreed that the
Baltics "had to agree to a request from another sovereign state [the
9 Nicholas Doughty, supra note 80, at Al.
4 The Baltics do not call these soldiers "Russian troops," but rather label them
"foreign military troops." U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.12
(1992).
' The presence of Russian troops is not limited just to these two Baltic States. U.N.
GAOR 47th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/497 (1992). See infra Part III-D-3. See
also U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.12 (1992).
96 General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics, supra note
83, at 1.
97 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
98 Id.
' Doughty, supra note 80, at Al.
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Baltics] for [its] troops to leave" but "social and economic issues had
to be sorted out first.""' President Yeltsin indefinitely suspended the
troop withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia on October 20, 1992,101
and accused the republics of violating the human rights of their
Russian minorities."° According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the
troop suspension was not aggressive in intention and was entirely
separate from the human rights abuses. Russia, deploring the Baltics'
linkage of the minority question with that of Russian troop
withdrawal, emphatically stated "the two issues were entirely
separate."' 3 Yeltsin said the pullout would resume only when new
troop withdrawal agreements had been signed with Estonia and
Latvia' 4 Yeltsin wanted to draft new agreements with the three
Baltics to safeguard "social guarantees" for Russian soldiers on their
soil 05 In July 1992, a Russian communiqu6 to EcoSoc stated that
the Russian government is "consider[ing] the possibility of imposing
temporary economic sanctions on the Republic of Estonia if the
Estonian authorities continue their discrimination against ethnic
Russians."'
1 6
A United Nations Resolution called for an agreement on the
Baltic troop withdrawal issue "without delay."' 0 7 To pressure Russia
to continue its pullout, the UN adopted a resolution on November 25,
1992, demanding "complete withdrawal of foreign military forces"
100 Vanora Bennett, Russia Replies To Baltic Criticism, REUTERS, Oct. 30, 1992.
101 General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics, supra note
83, at 1.
102 Id.
103 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
104 Id.
"I Doughty, supra note 80, at Al.
106 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.211992145 (1992).
"07 General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawl From Baltics, supra note
83, at 1.
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from Estonia and Latvia."°8 A resolution for the withdrawal of
foreign troops from the Baltics was also recently adopted by the
CSCE.'09 The Baltics requested that the issue of the complete
withdrawal of foreign military forces be included on the agenda for
the Forty-seventh General Assembly."' Russia, apparently hoping to
obviate potential conflict in its infancy, asked the General Assembly
to take up charges of those human rights violations in a general
debate."'
Allegations of discrimination against the sizable Russian
population in the Baltics have been made by both Russia and by the
Russian population living in the Baltics."2 Hoping to curtail these
human rights abuses, Russia proposed the full implementation of
treaties for the protection of minority rights. Furthermore, Russia
made statements, sent notes to the Ambassadors of the Baltics, and
attempted to use the CSCE mechanism "to deal with the violation of
human rights in the Baltic states.""..3
Russia's sudden interest in minority protection is ironic in
light of the abundant history of sanctioned discrimination by the
Russians against other minorities," 4 particularly against Estonians,
Latvians and Lithuanians."' A spokesperson for the Russian
Federations comments "[w]hat is to be gained by blaming them [the
Russians] now. The fifty years during which the Baltic States had
formed part of the Soviet Union can not simply be dismissed.""1 
6
Additionally, after 1945, the Russians who lived in the Baltics
108 Id.
'09 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 52, U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (1992).
11o Id. at 5.
. General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics, supra note
83, at 1.
112 Eide, supra note 63, at 1323-24.
113 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992.45 (1992).
114 Id.
.. See supra Part III-A concerning the mass deportations and the Russification
policy.
116 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
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contributed substantially to the economic development of those
republics.' 1 7 It is by nurturing both diversity and respect "towards the
distinctive features of even small groups of the population that will
[make it] possible to achieve harmony," and end these minority
problems." 8 The spokesperson agreed that it was very important that
the people in the Baltics speak their own languages, and that the
Russian speaking inhabitants must adapt. Despite the fact that, nearly
one-half of the population in Latvia speaks Russian as a primary
language. Under the newly adopted legislation these people cannot
find work unless they learn to speak the local language." 9 Since they
cannot leave the country overnight, or learn the language in twenty-
four hours, a transitional period is needed. 20
And a as a result there is a plethora of human rights violations.
Ambassador Makeev, the Permanent Representative of Russia to the
United Nations, submitted the following to the Human Rights
Department in EcoSoc:
Hundreds of thousands of permanent residents of
those States [the Baltics] have been deprived of their
citizenship, and many of them are losing their jobs
and are every day subjected to psychological pressure.
A policy of expelling the representatives of ethnic
minorities beyond the borders of those States is being
openly pursued, and restrictions are being imposed on
residents' contacts with their relatives in States
members [sic] of the Commonwealth of Independent
States.'2
Moreover, considering that "[a]s a result of the citizenship
legislation, about two million persons of non-indigenous nationalities,
117 Id.
". U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., at 11, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1992/SR.17 (1992).
"' U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
12} Id.
121 Id. at 2.
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mainly ethnic Russians, who had lived in those republics for decades,
have been arbitrarily stripped of their citizenship and of many civil,
political, and economic rights."' 2 2  Virtually one-third of the
populations of Latvia and Estonia are excluded from the political life
of these states.12 3 This is in clear contravention to the International
Bill of Human Rights which do not permit such arbitrary withdrawal
of citizenship or limitations on the right to obtain citizenship on
ethnic, linguistic, or religious grounds.
2 4
D. The Baltics' Viewpoint
Baltic leaders who were infuriated that President Yeltsin
25
suspended the Russian troop pullout from their countries, said that
this move further indicated Moscow's dangerous internal
instability.126 The Russian situation threatens not only the Baltics, but
also all of Europe, especially when "national radicals with imperial
ideas are fighting for power inside Russia."'2 7 As events in the first
week of October 1993 illustrated, the political dynamics of Russia are
quite precarious. The two Russian political fronts of the left and right
are scrambling to assert their influence. 2 8 Even in September 1992,
122 Id. at 18.
123 Id. at 19.
124 Id.
"z Latvia states that it has been pressured by Yeltsin "to provide social guarantees,
including living accommodations to the military forces of a great Power upon their
withdrawal from Latvia." U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV. 12
(1992).
126 On 23 September 1993, the Estonian government called the statements about
introducing possible economic sanctions as: threats, attempts to interfere in
Estonian domestic affairs, and an endeavor to influence the newly elected Prime-
Minister Rigikriv and the new President. Reactions to Russian Comments on
Human Rights Situation, BBC radio broadcast, Sept. 26, 1992.
127 Baltics Blame Pullout Freeze On Russian Turmoil, REUTERS, Oct. 30, 1992, at
D1. This quotation was stated by a Latvian governmental deputy.
1 This balancing and appeasing situation to the hard-liners and reformers was just
one more problem Gorbachev had to tightrope. STROBE TALBOTT AND MICHAEL
BEscHLOss, AT THE HIGHEST LEvELs THE INSIDE STORY OF THE END OF THE COLD
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Latvian Deputy-President Andreys Krastinas told reporters that the
delays in troop withdrawal and complaints over human rights
reflected Yeltsin's wish to regain popularity before an expected
showdown with his enemies. I29 Yeltsin's hawkish behavior was
meant to placate the Russian politicians who had begun maneuvering
internationally for Russia to hold the "sheriff's job," a patrol force
supposedly seeking to protect the human rights of the twenty-five
million ethnic Russians living in diaspora. 30
The Baltics claim that Russia's desires to be anointed the
"regional police force" epitomize Russia's new military doctrine of
protecting an amorphous group of so-called "Russian speakers" who
live in the former republics.13' Many fear that Russia has succeeded
in distorting the ethnic minority question to be an exclusively Russian
problem. This obfuscation has dangerous implications not only for
Russia's neighbors, but also for the global community. 3 "As long as
ex-Soviet troops remain on Baltic soil, leaders [of the Baltics] believe
Russian extremists could use them to reassert control if they were to
take power in Moscow."'
133
Russia's neighbors say Moscow is using the excuse of
protecting Russian minorities merely to disguise its latent imperial
and nationalistic ambitions. 34 Just as the presence of the German
nation in the Sudetenland gave Hitler a pretext for aggression and
invasion into Czechoslovakia, 135 Russia is using its neighbors'
minority problems to keep its troops on foreign soil.1 36 Russia,
WAR 195, 374-75 (1993).
129 Baltics Blame Pullout Freeze On Russian Turmoil, supra note 127, at Dl.
Note the rise of Vladimir Zhirnovsky.
130 Pyskir, supra note 85, at 19.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Baltics Blame Pullout Freeze On Russian Turmoil, supra note 127, at D1.
134 Pyskir, supra note 85, at 19.
135 WILLIAM SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 357-366 (1960)
[herinafter SHIRER].
136 The Red Army' Leaves Lithuania, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A20.
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indeed, is sending troops to other countries, such as Tajikistan,
Moldova, and Georgia,'37 yet maintains that the task of the Russian
military is to be a deterrent, fulfilling functions similar to UN peace-
keepers. 138
1. Estonia. Estonia's goal is to "protect the rights of all
peoples;"'39 its most vital task is to augment and secure its newly
restored independence; its hope is to strengthen its democratic
institutions, economy, national security and international relations. 4
To help achieve these goals, Estonia implemented a new law on
citizenship in February 1992.' 4' In considering its options, Estonia
rejected the zero option for citizenship and automatic citizenship for
all residents because of the potential for civil strife n4 and even forced
repatriation, 43  which would violate human rights norms.
Appreciating the fact that defective or inadequate citizenship
legislation during times of independence could lead to serious
137 Michael Gordon, As Its World View Narrows, Russia Seeks A New Mission,
N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at Al, A10.
138 Briefing (1) (Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, Apr. 12, 1993).
Giving Russia a green light to act as a guarantor of peace and stability will heighten
tensions, especially with Ukraine, which cited national security concerns vis-ai-vis
Russia as the primary reason for delaying ratification of the START I treaty.
139 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN/ 1993/35 (1993). Estonia's
Constitution of Aug 9, 1920, stated: "[a]ll Estonian citizens are equal in the eyes of
the law. There cannot be any public privileges or prejudices derived from birth,
religion, sex, rank, or nationality" and "[t]he minority nationalities are guaranteed
education in their mother tongue." Modeen, supra note 7, at 146. This previous
Constitution is relevant because Estonia and the other Baltics put particular
emphasis on previous statehood; provisions in the previous Constitution can be
useful blueprints.
140 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 46, U.N. Doc A/47/PV. 17 (1992).
141 U.N. ESCOR, 44 Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub/ 1992/SR. 19 (1992).
142 This approach was a major cause for the strife in Moldova and Georgia. U.N.
ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23, (1993).
143 Estonia did, however, offer "encouragement and financial assistance to those
who wished to return voluntarily to their country of origin." U.N. ESCOR, 49th
Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23 (1993).
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minority issues, and hoping to obviate the possibility for unrest,
Estonia declared that it would adopt international standards of
citizenship.'
In reality, only Estonian citizens, defined by the 1938 pre-
Soviet Occupation Law on Citizenship, were entitled to vote.
Respecting the legal principle of the continuity of citizenship, and
recognizing that Russia is the self-styled successor state to the Soviet
Union, Estonia considers citizens of the former Soviet Union who
currently reside in Estonia to be Russian citizens, not Estonians,
unless they have become citizens of another country.'45 Furthermore,
only permanent residents were given the right to vote in local and
district elections.146 Estonia effectively declares all non-nationals of
Estonia to be aliens without residence permits, i.e., illegal
immigrants. 1
47
Consequently, thirty-eight percent1 48 of its permanent
population are now aliens. The refusal to even grant them residency
violates Article 25(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.'49 The new citizenship legislation also deprives all
Russian speaking people of the right to be elected to local self-
government institutions. The Parliament of Estonia also declared all
grounds for acquiring residency credentials for Russian servicemen
to be invalid, including residence permits themselves. 5 These
immigration requirements "involve the practice of ethnic cleansing
and the introduction of an Estonian form of apartheid."'' Hundreds
14 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1992/85 (1993).
145 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 49-50, U.N. Doc A/47/PV. 17 (1992).
146 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23 (1993).
147 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doe. A/48/22 (1993).
148 Latvia declared 40 percent of its population to be aliens. U.N. ESCOR, 49th
Sess., at 5, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1993/93 (1993).
14, Id. This provision states, "[e]very citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity... (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service
in his country." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23,
1966, art. 25(c), Supp. (No. 16), 52 U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967).
"0 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/48/22 (1993).
151 1d.
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of thousands of Russians are now deprived of social guarantees and
doomed to political disfranchisement, and the introduction of further
obstacles prevents them from acquiring the right to residency and
work papers. 152 Basically, ethnic Russians have no possibility at all
to become citizens or even residents of Estonia. Without having
citizenship, they cannot work, vote, or secure social service
compensation.
Estonia rebuts by saying that the voting laws provide a legal
basis for those people who settled in Estonia at the hands of the
Soviet occupation to apply for naturalized citizenship'53 and that
Russia is demanding that Russians be granted Estonian citizenship,
with Russia acting as their guardian and protector in order to bind
Estonia to the Russian Federation. 54 In effect, Estonia says, Russia
is demanding foreign citizens be allowed to vote in Estonia's
parliamentary elections.155 The elections in Estonia were organized
in accordance with existing legislation and were monitored by
Council of Europe observers.'56 Indeed, reports prepared by the US
State Department found no systematic human rights violations in
Estonia. 57 In its allowances for naturalization and voting, numerous
international experts have concluded that Estonia's citizenship law is
"among the most liberal in the world."'' 58 But the High Commissioner
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe publicly
"admonish[ed] Estonia and persuade[d] it to begin revising its
laws"' 59 because the voting legislation of Estonia and Latvia violated
the Helsinki Accords.
For all its supposed freedom, forty-two percent of the
152 Id.
153 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 48, U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (1992).
154 Id.
155 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 46, U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (1992).
156 Reactions to Russian Comments on Human Rights Situation, supra
note 126.
157 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23 (1993).
15' U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 48, U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (1992).
15' The Red Army Leaves Lithuania, supra note 136, at A20.
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Estonian population was kept away from September 1993 elections.
160
Moscow was particularly incensed that Russians were excluded en
masse from the elections because they had no automatic right to
citizenship.'16  President Yeltsin stated that "the Estonian leaders
'forgot' about certain geopolitical and demographic realities, and
Russia has the means to remind them of such realities .... The
principle of good-neighborliness [sic] has been put into jeopardy."'
62
As a result of the voting legislation, Russia has thus decided to adopt
a rigid position towards Estonia.1
63
From Estonia's perspective, however, the need for withdrawal
of Russian armed forces from its territory is the primary stumbling
block in the bilateral relations between these two states. 164 Estonians
believe that the Russian troops are in Estonia not because the
Russians were supposedly kept away from elections, but because
Russian nationalists believe that Russia has historical and geopolitical
claims to Estonian territory and that Estonia has no right to
independence.' 65 Offended by Russia's bullying, Estonia retorts, "[1]f
somebody does not agree that this is so, he should use corresponding
international mechanisms so as to voice his views, not threats,' ' 166 and
the introduction of sanctions would be in complete conflict with the
free trade agreement signed between Russia and Estonia on
September 9, 1992.167
2. Latvia. In the last fifty years, no other state has had its
1 Reactions to Russian Comments on Human Rights Situation, supra
note 126.
161 Mark Trevelyan, Yeltsin Attacks Baltics on Rights, Stops Troop Exit, THE
REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, Oct. 30, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Trevelyan].
162 U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/48/223 (1993).
'63 Reactions to Russian Comments on Human Rights Situation, supra
note 126.
164 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 52, U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (1992).
165 Id. at51.
1' Reactions to Russian Comments on Human Rights Situation, supra
note 126.
167 Id.
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indigenous populations reduced so dangerously low as a result of the
Communist government's techniques of mass immigrations,
expulsions, and pogroms than the Latvians. 168 Because of the paucity
of ethnic Latvians, Latvia is now making "great efforts towards
preserving its own language."1 69 In March 1994, for example, Latvia
adopted a law on languages under which Russian speakers, a group
comprising more than forty-five percent of the Latvian population, 7
are not guaranteed the right to be educated in their own language and
cannot even speak Russian in public places.' 7 ' These Russians,
Latvia insists, are not being excluded from the Latvian culture, but are
"merely being asked to conform to the new situation created by
independence."172 Russia charges that the goal of this measure is to
create a "mono-ethnic state" and, by exerting pressures on them to
leave, is aimed at reducing the Russian speaking population.
173
Latvia justifies this language law as the only existing model
capable of solving its internal problems. Its unique demographic
situation requires it to solve citizenship questions and to create a
secure environment in order "to preserve its national destiny" of
becoming a democratic free market state. This goal will be
unattainable if Latvia must give immigrants every opportunity to
integrate into its society, to preserve their own language, and to
develop their own cultural traditions. 75 This realization was integral
for passage by Latvian's Parliament of a law whose principle criteria
was a long residency requirement and a substantial knowledge of
168 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A147/PV.12 (1992).
169 Id. For a discussion on the importance of language, se6 supra Part I-A.
170 Doughty, supra note 80, at Al.
171 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR. 19 (1992).
172 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
173 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.19 (1992).
17 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV. 12 (1992).
175 However, this notion seems to conflict with another goal of Latvia, which is to
try and find the optimal solution for two "acute and unavoidable problems -- the
correction of the injustices fostered by the illegal occupation [of the Soviets] and
the protection of the rights of all citizens of Latvia." Id. at 3-5.
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Latvian. 7 6 Under the new citizenship laws, military forces and
foreign citizens, to whom the "existence of an independent Latvia is
unacceptable," are especially singled out as undesirable.'77
Surprisingly, Latvia insists that the Latvian law guarantees each
individual's human rights according to international standards, and
adhere to "U.N. legal norms and principles."'1
7 8
In October 1991, Latvia adopted a law reestablishing the
rights of Latvian citizens and delineating the basic requirements
governing naturalization.179 Under this law persons who had Latvian
citizenship before June 17, 1940 and their direct descendants,
automatically became citizens of Latvia, irrespective of where they
presently reside. However, all those who had moved to Latvia
thereafter, becoming citizens of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic
-- in addition to their USSR citizenship -- are now regarded as aliens
or stateless persons. Only compounding the difficulties for the ethnic
Russians is the enactment of extremely difficult citizenship
legislation that conditions citizenship on sixteen years' residency and
a substantial knowledge of the Latvian language. Latvia has also
introduced a visa regime for visits. 80 As a result of the new
requirements, many Russians in Latvia feel themselves to be "second-
class citizens, cut off from their mother country. ' 81
3. Lithuania. Lithuania finds the Baltics particularly sensitive
to the problems of minorities because "they do not want to impose on
others what they themselves had suffered."' 82 Lithuania itself has 109
different nations within its borders,'83 with Russians constituting the
' /ld. at 5.
177 d.
78 Id. at 8.
17,) U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR. 19 (1992).
' " Pyskir, supra note 85, at 19.
's" Trevelyan, supra note 161, at Al.
', U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. EICN.41993/SR.23, (1993).
18.1 Id.
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largest minority group.'84 A natural sense of hostility exists towards
the Russians because their needs were previously catered to with
numerous Russian speaking schools, Russian language newspapers,
radio, and television programs. No counterpart programs existed for
those Lithuanians who were deported to Russia.'85
Lithuania believes that the present question of Russian
minorities in the Baltic States is inevitably linked to the presence of
"troops of the former Soviet Union"'' 8 6 and that "there would be no
problem with the Russian minorities in the Baltic region if it were not
for the inflammatory actions of those nostalgic for the former regime
and its lost empire.' 1 87 The "decrepit military installations and the
disastrous environmental situation" the Russian soldiers constructed
only increased Lithuania's desire to have the troops leave its soil,188
and at the end of August, The New York Times wrote, "[T]he Pope
has come and the Red Army has gone -- two reasons for jubilation in
Lithuania."'8 9
Why have the Russian soldiers left Lithuanian soil, yet still
plague the other Baltic States? The answer lies more with Lithuania's
common sense than with Russian goodwill. Lithuania did not enact
extreme discriminatory laws against Russian residents, abridge their
voting rights, refuse to grant citizenship, or relegate them to the
outskirts of society. '9 For example, to hold senior posts, Lithuania
requires people to know only 1500 words of the Lithuanian
language.' 9' Lithuania did not bar Russia's access to its bases in
184 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23, (1993).
85 Id. Even though the Russians were catered to, and thus could be seen as
"benefiting" in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, in the Feb. 10, 1991
referendum, 75 percent of the Russians voted for Lithuanian independence. U.N.
ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
186 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/SR.23 (1993).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 The Red Arny Leaves Lithuania, supra note 136, at A20.
190 Id.
191 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
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Kaliningrad, but rather avoided confrontation over this exclave and
other sensitive military sites. By refusing to stir the boiling cauldron
of nationalistic passions, Lithuania made it easier for President
Yeltsin to justify the withdrawal of Russian troops in the face of
Parliamentary extremists whose support he so desperately needs. 92
Estonia and Latvia have followed an entirely different route.
Their new citizenship and voting legislation were enacted with
deliberate malicious intent. In both Latvia and Estonia, the language
proficiency requirements are leading to mass unemployment and
disenfranchisement among Russians. Under the laws of both
republics, having a legal source of income is a prerequisite for
obtaining citizenship, but one cannot obtain a job without being a
citizen. Furthermore, an unemployed alien or stateless person, in
addition to being deprived of the right to state assisted benefits,
cannot become a citizen of Latvia or Estonia, and thus devolves into
a vicious circle of despair.
193
IV. IMPLICATIONS
On August 17, 1992, Mr. Berezny of the Russian Federation
explained to the Forty-fourth Session of the Commission on Human
Rights that "[I]f gross violations of human rights continued, Russia
would be forced to bring the matter to the attention of the United
Nations."'' 94 The alleged violations of human rights have been
brought to the attention of the United Nations and denied by all three
of the Baltic states. The Baltics, in turn, have brought their own
grievances before the United Nations. Unfortunately, this attempt to
attract international recognition and possible international action, just
as with many human rights problems, has proven to be largely
unsuccessful. Mr. Berezny finished his address with the words,
192 Id.
"3 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/93 (1993).
1' U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR. 19 (1992).
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"[T]he Russian Federation is determined to defend the rights of those
of its citizens living outside its borders, and has the means to do
1).' 195
These means, apart from military might, could entail
"bring[ing] the matter before the United Nations [and] calling for the
adoption of international economic sanctions against Estonia [and
presumably Latvia] and before international inter-parliamentary
bodies;" or even, as was planned on September 20, 1992, to suspend
the State Treaty between Russia and Estonia. 96 The concluding
remarks by Mr. Berezny are disconcerting, and if they foretell of
actions to come, will make peaceful resolution even more necessary.
Russia is apparently ready to defend, with all of its forces, the rights
of Russians living outside its frontiers. 
197
The Russian/Baltic difficulties present a sticky situation for
the United States and the rest of the international community, because
clearly "atrocities have been committed by all parties."'98 NATO
diplomats said the Russian troop withdrawal problem "was wrapped
up in Russia's practical problems" and was a difficult problem "for
the alliance... to take sides in." One NATO spokesman said "[t]he
Baltics are clearly in the right here, but we cannot afford to upset the
Russians by being seen to interfere... Sending observers' 99 [to the
Baltics] would just strengthen the hand of hard-liners against
Yeltsin." 2°' Nonetheless, the Baltics have requested observers to
supervise the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Lithuania, for
example, asked NATO in September 1992 for Western observers to
make sure Russian troops would withdraw. On October 30, 1992,
NATO did take some action, stating that it was concerned by
"Russia's decision to halt the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic
19s Id. (emphasis added).
196 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1992/45 (1992).
'9" U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
19' Thedor Meron, The Case for War Crines Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 125.
'99 Doughty, supra note 80, at Al.
200 Id.
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states and urged Moscow to resume the pullout without delay."20 1
Which side serves the United States' best political, economic,
and human rights interests? These are questions that that continue to
hinder US involvement, and without clarity the parties to support and
oppose are not so easily identified. The United States has strongly
supported President Boris Yeltsin in the past, even when he
disbanded Parliament and seized more executive power. Even so, the
US has always had a soft spot for fledgling democracies that are
battling off the imperialism of a much larger country, and as a result
has strongly supported the Baltics' separation from the USSR. The
US never accepted the annexation of the Baltics and was quick to re-
recognize their existence diplomatically.2 2 Needless to say, any such
support contains the added tension of indirectly bolstering the
criticism of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and similar ardent nationalists.
The United States has publicly called for the withdrawal of
Russian troops. The US delegation to the United Nations said "we
would make clear [to the Russians] that our view [is] that withdrawal
of Russian forces from the Baltic States increases rather than
decreases Russia's security because it confirms Russia's standing as
a respected member of the democratic community." 203 Pushing for
troop pullout, the US stated that the presence of Russian troops is
"inconsistent with the identities of fully sovereign and independent
members of the international community.
' 204
At the Vancouver Summit in 1993, President Clinton
expressed the US' concern over the human rights of Russian
minorities and of all minorities living in and around the region.0 5
201 id.
202 On September 2, 1991 President Bush said, "[t]he United States has always
supported the independence of the Baltic states and is now prepared immediately
to establish diplomatic relations with their governments." Andrew Rosenthal, Soviet
Turmoil: Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Republic Leaders Move To Take Power From
Soviet Congress; U.S. Tie To Baltics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at Al.
203 General Assembly Urges Russian Troop Withdrawal From Baltics, supra note
83, at 1.
204 id.
201 Pyskir, supra note 85, at 19.
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Concern alone is not very satisfying, and certainly does little to
ameliorate the growing tensions. The implications of the human
fights abuses have become even more pressing in the aftermath of the
Russian elections of December, 1993, and the strong showing of
nationalist Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovsky. His ultra-right wing
platform "stunned the world ...with its strength in Russia's
,,206parliamentary elections, winning the largest bloc of votes of any
party with nearly twenty-five percent.2 7 Yegor Gaidar, a close ally
of President Yeltsin and "perhaps the most reform-minded politician
in Russia... [who] was humiliated in the[se] ... elections" said of
Zhirinovsky and of the election:
During the election campaign last year, I said that
Zhirinovsky reminded me of Hitler in 1929 ...
Unfortunately I was mistaken. Zhirinovsky with his
25 percent of the votes has already surpassed Hitler in
1929 and has achieved the result that the Nazis got in
the Reichstag elections of 1930.208
Gaidar's parallel to Weimar Germany is appropriate. Germany was
not just crippled by the loss of World War I, but further stunted by the
malicious degradations and deliberate humiliations of the Treaty of
Versailles. Bolstered by the atmosphere of despair this treaty
instilled, the nationalistic policies of Adolf Hitler grew more and
more appealing. Adolf Hitler's party, the National Socialists,
originally a weak, almost defunct party, and led by a political
prisoner, obtained the Chancellorship in 1933.209
The kindling for a similarly extreme climate, one necessary
for the rise of Hitler, already exists in Russia. The conditions in
206 Celestine Bohlen, Zhirinovsky Cult Grows: All Power to the Leader, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at Al.
' Michael Specter, The Great Russia Will Live Again, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994
at 29 [hereinafter Specter].
20' Id. at 29, 33.
209 See SHIRER, supra note 135, at 182-87.
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Russia include:
[T]he conditions for extremism [sic] .... You have a
stagnating economy. You have real poverty. You
have enormous increases in inequality. You have
rising expectations. You have a general sense of
disorder and you have shocking crime everywhere you
look... [It] is an ideal platform for the enemies of
democracy."' 0
These conditions are fueling the support of Zhirinovsky while
weakening Yeltsin's programs and popularity. Zhirinovsky exploits
these conditions by crying "[Fear has taken control of the country
[and] [w]e will stop this all." '' The need for scapegoats and for a
return of nationalistic pride make Zhirinovsky and his beliefs ever
more appealing. Zhirinovsky has publicly demanded protection for
the Russian minorities living in other republics and even called for
pre-World War II boundaries to be reestablished. It is only prudent
for other states to keep a watchful eye on these speeches, for the
human rights violations in the Baltics are reason enough for an
invasion.
Many states are indeed watchful of Zhirinovsky. Ukraine took
heed to his cloaked threats when it agreed to become a non-nuclear
state on January 12, 1994. Ukraine, known as the breadbasket of
Europe, ranks second of the fifteen former republics in population,
third in size, and, although experiencing the similar hardships of the
other newly independent republics, is one of the more powerful forces
in the area. Because of its second class status in relation to Russia,
Ukraine refused to surrender its first-strike capability and the
deterrent security of its nuclear arsenal. Such caution seemed prudent
because the relations between the two countries have, at times, been
strained. Alarmed over the numerous intermittent verbal skirmishes
2'0 See Specter, supra note 207, at 28.
211 Id.
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over such issues as the ownership of the Black Sea fleet, Ukraine
justifiably feared a Russian retaliation or first strike. To ward off
such an attack, therefore, Ukraine feverishly clung to its nuclear
weapons.
By holding out in nuclear reduction talks, Ukraine also hoped
to receive inducements and rewards from the West to remove them. 2
Although this money from the West sweetened the removal, 1 3 the
primary reason to give in could have turned on Ukraine's shaky
relationship with Russia. Rather than function as a deterrent, the
nuclear weapons could have ironically given Russia a reason for
invading its territory. The expressed purpose of protecting Russian
minorities, coupled with the secondary agenda of removing Ukraine's
nuclear threat, could be reason enough for an invasion induced by
Zhirinovsky. Judging from the rantings of Zhirinovsky, such a first-
strike is entirely feasible. Alexander Rutskoi said that Russia may act
from a position of force in order to ensure that other countries respect
the human rights of Russian minorities. He claimed "it is precisely
this sabre-rattling which has helped warring parties come to the
negotiating table in Moldova and South Ossetia.' 2 1 4 Russian
willingness to assist, and, in fact, dominate the international police
force beat is precisely the reason for the well-warranted concern of
Ukraine and the Baltic States.
As with all conflicts, depending on one's perspective, the
presence of Russian troops is either helping or hurting. The Russians
may have been integral in ending the conflict in Moldova, but,
according to Chairman of the Georgian State Council Eduard
Shevardnadze, the Russians are arming the rebels in Abkhazia and
212 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Offering to Mediate Russian-Ukranian Disputes on
Security, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1993, at A6.
213 The control over the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal has been a major concern
of the West. The surrendering of Ukraipe's portion of this arsenal is a major
advancement towards collecting all of the Soviet nuclear weapons under a central
authority. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aides Worry About Spread of Arms from Sales by the
Soviets, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at5.
214 Boulton, supra note 1, at 2.
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obstructing his attempts to unify the country.215 In a letter dated
October 8, 1992 to the President of the United Nation's Security
Council, Mr. Shevardnadze deplored the "military aggression
unleashed by mercenaries from the North and Abkhaz secessionists
against Georgia .... According to reliable sources reaching us from
the occupied territory, mass executions of Georgian civilian
population, widespread torture, rape and other atrocities are being
committed. 216 These nationalists fighting for secession and inflicting
the "mass executions" have been aided by Russian troops, the same
troops that wish to be designated as "international peace maker.,
217
Russia has indeed been politicking for the job of international
peace maker, i.e., police force for the area. Citing Russia's "vital
interests" and "special responsibilities." Boris Yeltsin recently asked
the world community to deputize Russia so that it could start policing
what used to be the Soviet Union. On February 28, 1993, in a speech
to the Civic Union21 1 Yeltsin said "the time has come for
distinguished international organizations, including the United
Nations, to grant Russia special powers of a guarantor of peace and
215 U.N. ESCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/24641 (1992).
216 U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/24641 (1992).
217 A contrary viewpoint is offered by Mr. van Walt's testimony, submitted on behalf of Pax
Christi International to the Forty-fourth Session of the Commission on Human Rights:
There were reports of artillery and even of chemical weapons
being used. It was precisely the neo-nationalistic drive of the
Georgian authorities that was threatening all the inhabitants of
Abkhazia. The Abkhazians themselves were not ethno-
nationalistic, since they were striving for self-determination not
only for their ethnic group but for the entire multi-ethnic region.
On behalf of the people of Abkhazia, which included many
Armenians, Russians, Greeks and Georgians, I appeal to the Sub-
Commission [sic] to voice its concern to the Georgian authorities
and to call for a dialogue to resolve what was essentially a
political issue.
U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.33 (1992).
218 An ad hoc coalition of former Communist Party apparatchiks; Pyskir, supra
note 85, at 19.
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stability in regions of the former USSR. 219 If Russian troops are
given such sanctioned permission to patrol these regions, coupled
with an unbridled authority to intervene when and where they see fit,
the potential for turmoil is greatly increased. These dangers should
provide the impetus to end the Baltic/Russian difficulties.
But aside from these valid geopolitical considerations, simple
morality should neither tolerate nor even encourage the human rights
abuses.22 The International Bill of Human Rights was written to be
used, and perhaps more importantly, the treaties are the only method
of international minority protection available. 22' If these clear
violations, which carry such terrific consequences, are not enforced,
when will this Bill of Rights be used? Indeed, the protection of
minority rights must be pursued in a way that territorial integrity is
not endangered except in extreme situations where no other
possibility exists to preserve the existence and identity of the group
concerned.
Regardless of who is at fault, this situation will not improve
unless some form of negotiation is attempted. Both sides will be able
to buttress their assertions and allegations with favorable statistics
and quotations showing that either: (a) this percentage of people was
unable to vote in the last election, or (b) our elections were open to all
and even observed by the UN. Without realistic attempts to
ameliorate the conflict, each party's intransigence will ossify and only
exacerbate the existing difficulties and eventually make hostile
conflict likely. The problem with the Baltics must be resolved in the
same way as any other problem associated with the breakup of the
219 Id.
220 Implicitly encourage is tantamount to publicly condemning, but privately
ignoring. A timely example that this route is the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovenia.
The dearth of any substantial action on the part of the West has encouraged the
nefarious behavior of both sides to grow unabashed. Michael Kelly, Surrender and
Blame, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 19, 1994, at 44-51.
221 It is neither practical nor feasible "in peacetime to compel any state to liberate
its national minorities by granting part of its territory as a nation-state for its
minority citizens." Modeen, supra note 7, at 32.
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Soviet Union -- without political or nationalistic bias.222 An effective
manner to resolve the difficulties, therefore, would be to "establish
mutually acceptable bilateral agreements in strict compliance with
international standards. 223 A framework for such bilateral treaties
already exists. For example, the current legal basis for the conduct of
inter-state relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic
of Estonia is the "Treaty on the Basic Principles of Inter-State
Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
and the Republic of Estonia" signed between the two on January 12,
1991. This treaty "can serve as an effective instrument for the
settlement, between the parties, of questions of mutual interest. 224
By using the International Bill of Human Rights as a
blueprint, Russia and the Baltics can draft bilateral agreements
detailing the specific rights of the ethnic Russians in Estonia, Latvia,
and, to some extent, in Lithuania. This proposed solution is not to
disparage the role of outsiders. Indeed, Western countries can play
a large role in pressuring both sides to reach a peaceful solution. The
European Union states have tied their decisions on the recognition of
breakaway states to specific conditions concerning "respect for
human rights of individuals and minorities within newly constituted
states." Although this route is anachronistic, it is an example not only
of the "increased willingness of states to use non-violent political
intercessions to promote respect for internationally recognized human
rights," but it also illustrates the persuasive force third parties play in
influencing peaceful human rights settlement.2 25 Albeit Russia has
denied any linkage the presence of its troops play with the human
rights abuses, and the Baltics have downplayed the human rights
violations, Russia should acquiesce and remove its troops so long as
the Baltics agree to observe the rights of the Russian minorities. The
fear the neighboring republics have of the Russian troops is indeed
justified, but the only way the troops will leave is if Russia is
2 2 2 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 16, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/19921SR.33 (1992).
221 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/SR.19 (1992).
224 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/45 (1992).
225 Brown, supra note 46, at 217.
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convinced that the rights of their ethnic Russians are not being
disparaged so that the troops' presence to "protect" them is no longer
necessary. Moves to end the national minority abuses will allow
President Yeltsin to recall his troops without incensing his nationalist
supporters.
Estonia and Latvia should take heed to Lithuania's example.
Estonia and Latvia should introduce appropriate amendments in their
national legislation on citizenship. For example, the two republics
could:
--abolish the examination of the official language for
persons over the age of 50;
--give precise specification in law of the requirements
for proficiency in the language and monitoring of
compliance with them in practice;
--reduce the period of residence necessary to obtain
citizenship in Latvia to five years and amend the
procedure for determining the duration of permanent
residence within the territory;
--review and reduce the range of persons who cannot
be given citizenship; [and]
--grant citizenship to children born of stateless
persons.226
Rather than solicit a Russian invasion, they should lower the
discriminatory barriers to citizenship and voting and create for
President Yeltsin a face-saving route of removing his troops.
Most states in the world are multi-ethnic. Inevitably there will
be an intermixing of cultures and languages. Cultural mixing,
however, should not mean conflict. Dangers do arise when a
dominant group deliberately and systematically imposes its will onto
the weaker. Such human rights abuses only mutate the evolving
mosaic of culture into a truncated piece of mono-ethnicity. Such a
path condemns all to the stagnant views of uniformity, inevitably
226 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993.93 (1993).
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stunting independent thought and strangling the growth of distinct
cultures and tongues. A society, however, that allows for all people
to flourish implicitly encourages each group to contribute to a
burgeoning mosaic of humanity, piece by piece, culture by culture,
and tradition by tradition. The dominance of any group is temporal
and those who inflict heinous acts on others only invite revenge later
on.227 Overlooking the rights of a minority today beckons subsequent
violations and possibly opens up a chain of retribution for a new
Russian/Baltic predicament, a new Bosnia-Hercegovenia.
If this conflict is overlooked, another plight is destined to
further the perpetual cycle of abuse. Let us observe and protect the
rights of each national minority to, as the International Bill of Human
Rights so precisely stated "enjoy their own culture, to vote, or to use
their own language.,
228
227 In the Soviet referendum on national unity held in March of 1991, which posed
the question "[d]o you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which
the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?," the
majority of those who voted answered in the negative. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991,
at Al. The new Union Treaty, whose tentative signing led to the coup d'itat against
President Mikhail Gorbachev, called upon the republics to recognize "as the most
important principle of their association, the priority of human rights proclaimed in
the Universal Declaration of the United Nations and in international covenants."
Lori Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American Courts,
100 YALE L. J. 2315, 2316 (1991).
2128 U.N. ESCOR, 49th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/NGO/21 (1993).

